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Critical Approaches to
Property Institutions
MICHAEL A. HELLER*

Three Faces of Private Property

P

INTRODUCTION

rivate property is a rather elusive concept. Any kid knows
what it means for something to be mine or yours, but grownup legal theorists get flustered when they try to pin down the
term.' Typically they, actually we, turn to a familiar analytic
toolkit: including, for example, Blackstone's image of private
property as "sole and despotic dominion"; 2 Hardin's metaphor of
the "tragedy of the commons"; 3 and, more generally, the division
4
of ownership into a trilogy of private, commons, and state forms.
While each analytic tool has a distinguished pedigree and certain
present usefulness, each also imposes a cost because it renders
invisible many new forms of property.
This essay suggests that legal scholarship, particularly its lawand-economics branch, relies on an outdated and overly simplistic image of private property, an understanding that acknowledges just one of the many faces of private property. I will focus
here on three faces-first, the possibility of creating a new ideal
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. This essay is abridged and
adapted from Michael A. Heller, The Shifting Analytics of PropertyLaw, in 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming Jan. 2001). Thanks to Kim Krawiec, Carol
Rose, and participants at the University of Oregon Conference on New and Critical
Approaches to Law and Economics and the Tel Aviv University Conference on
Achievements in Legal Scholarship. The University of Michigan Law School Cook
Endowment provided generous research support.
1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 98-100
(1977) (contrasting lay and technical understandings of private property).
2 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
3 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
4 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RiGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 37-42 (1988).
[417]
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type of property; second, synthesizing existing ideal types; and
third, redefining our core types-that may render private property
a more tractable term, one better designed to identify and support innovation at the frontiers of social relations.
I
THE PROPERTY TRILOGY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Let us begin with the preeminent analytic tool of property theory, that is, the well-worn trilogy of ownership forms-private,
commons, and state property. The trilogy has long formed the
focal point for normative and practical property debates.' As
Frank Michelman states: "We need some reasonably clear conceptions of regimes that are decidedly not [private property],
"..
6
with which [private property] regimes can be compared .
This process of working from ideal types pervades property theory stretching back past Locke's discussion of the state of nature
and forward to the modern law-and-economics debates. Today,
law and economics scholars deploy the trilogy in calling for a tilt
toward private property, some progressive scholars disparage private property and advocate expanded state control, while communitarians press for expanding the scope of commons property.
While theorists push reforms toward one type or the other, none
subjects the trilogy itself to much challenge. The trilogy has become so entrenched as to seem almost natural, beyond serious
contestation or elaboration. Before we go about constructing
new ideal types, or synthesizing existing ones, let us briefly recapitulate the trilogy itself. So, what are these ideal types?
A.

Private Property

Private property is a complicated idea to pin down precisely, as
its boundaries fray at the edges.7 For property theorists (and for
ordinary lay folk'), a workaday understanding seems reasonably
within reach. For example, Frank Michelman focuses his definition on rules for initial acquisition and reassignment. He defines
5See, e.g., id. at 44.
6 Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NoMos
XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 5 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1982).
7See generally Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE
L.J. 1163 (1999).
8 See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 99-100 (discussing layperson's view of property
as thing-ownership).
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sole ownership to mean "[t]he rules must allow that at least some
objects of utility or desire can be fully owned by just one person," and freedom of transfer to mean "[o]wners are both immune from involuntary deprivation or modification of their
ownership rights and empowered to transfer their rights to others
at will, in whole or in part."9 Similarly, Jeremy Waldron defines
private property "around the idea that contested resources are to
be regarded as separate objects each assigned to the decisional
authority of some particular individual (or family or firm)."'"
These standard definitions can be multiplied many times over,
but all partake of and help keep current Blackstone's endlessly
repeated definition of private property as "that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe."" While the image of sole dominion
has never adequately described any real world property ownership, as even Blackstone recognized,'" the idea rings through the
ages, and continues to block clear thinking about private
property.
B.

Commons Property

Commons property has been the residual category that theorists usually use when they describe a regime that is not private
or state property. Michelman defines a commons property regime as one where "there are never any exclusionary rights. All
is privilege. People are legally free to do as they wish, and are
able to do, with whatever objects (conceivably including persons)
are in the [commons]."' 3 To restate, this definition means that
9 Michelman, supra note 6, at 5. These definitions harken back to and build another unsteady part of the standard conceptual apparatus of property, crystalized in
the Hohfeld-Honor6 picture of property as a "bundle of rights," discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 27-33. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 65, 96
(Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923); A.M. Honord, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE

107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).

10 Jeremy Waldron, Property Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 3, 6 (Dennis Patterson
11 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *2.

ed., 1996).

12 See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108
YALE L.J. 601 (1998) (discussing the ever-present thicket of restrictions Blackstone
recognized in his day).
13 Michelman, supra note 6, at 5.
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every individual may use any object of property and no individual has the right to stop someone else from using the object.
Although this is not the place to elaborate the point, a useful
distinction could be drawn between the liberals' notion of a
"state of nature" and the utilitarians' image of commons property; both images share a core definition-everyone has privileges of inclusion and no one has rights of exclusion-but a
different emphasis and context. Usually, liberal property theorists deploy the state of nature image to describe a pre-political
commons which then evolves towards a regime of private property;14 while the commons metaphor of modern law-and-economists reflects their goal of explaining the marginal evolution
toward private property in specific scarce resources, such as the
enclosure of the English commons.1 5 For all these scholars, from
old liberals to new law-and-economists, explaining the transition
from commons to private property is the core problem and opportunity for property theory.
C.

State Property

State property, also sometimes called collective property, can
be defined as a property regime in which:
[iln principle, material resources are answerable to the needs
and purposes of society as a whole, whatever they are and
however they are determined, rather than to the needs and
purposes of particular individuals considered on their own.
No individual has such an intimate association with any object
that he can make decisions about
16 its use without reference to
the interests of the collective.
As Waldron notes, a state property regime is similar to commons property in that no individual stands in a specially privileged position with regard to any resource, but is distinguished
from commons property because the state has a special status or
distinct interest-that of owner of all resources able to include or
See

note 4, at 277-78; see, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES
327-44 (Peter Laslett rev. ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (3d.
ed. 1698); BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *2-8. Rose uncovers the contradictions
these narratives obscure as they move across the commons/private boundary. Carol
M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectivesfrom Game Theory, Narrative Theory,
Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 52 (1990).
15 See Heller, supra note 7, at 1194 n.165.
16 Waldron, supra note 4, at 40 & n.30; see also C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of
Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSm ONS 1, 5-6 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) (offering substantially the same definition of state property).
14

WALDRON, supra

OF GOVERNMENT
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exclude all individuals, according to the rules of that particular
state. 17 In other words, the collective, represented usually by the
state, holds all rights of exclusion and is the sole locus of decision-making regarding use of resources. So, a subsidiary set of
questions then need to be answered to specify a state property
regime fully, including what is the "collective interest" and what
procedures will be used to apply that conception to a particular
case.
Figure 1 represents this trilogy simply, the three forms together
occupying the entire space of imagination about property
relations.
FIGURE

1:

THE STANDARD TRILOGY

Today, for most property theorists, this limited vision of property has shrunk even further. State property has become a less
and less important category, particularly since the fall of socialist
states and rise of the worldwide trend towards privatization. 18
For liberal, communitarian, and utilitarian theorists alike, the trilogy may effectively reduce down to a dichotomy-private and
commons-so that all theoretical work takes place in the interplay of these two regimes. For example, Michelman says that a
commons can be seen as "a scheme of universally distributed, allencompassing privilege . . . that is opposite to [private property] . . . ."' Similarly, as the economist Yoram Barzel notes, the
standard economic analysis of property has "tend[ed] to classify
ownership status into all-or-nothing categories, the latter being
17 Waldron, supra note 4, at 41.
18 Property theorists always recognize that any actual regime should and will contain all elements of the trilogy. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102
YALE L.J. 1315, 1381 & n.342, 1397 n.413 (1993).

19 Michelman, supra note 6, at 9.
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termed 'common property'-property
that has no restrictions
20
placed on its use."

II
THREE APPROACHES TO THE PROPERTY TRILOGY

The ideal-typic trilogy straightjackets analysis. Consider the
standard example where people share access to resources in a
commons and then proceed to waste the resource through
overuse. In this scenario, theorists often see an instance of Hardin's metaphor of the "tragedy of the commons"-another core
concept of property law. By looking to the standard trilogy, liberals and utilitarians point to privatization as a conservation solution, while communitarians point to those cases where close-knit
groups manage to work together and avoid tragedy. 2 1 Trilogy
and tragedy provide useful foils for legal theorists from all
camps. But do these categories define the only possibilities?
As I will show, there are at least three productive approaches-constructive, integrative, and definitional-to updating our understanding of private property. All three versions
begin by observing previously unnoticed or unexplained property
puzzles and end by moving property theory beyond the existing
analytic tools, in this case the standard trilogy, and the limited
debates those tools allow. While the following discussion draws
on my previous work to demonstrate these three variants, the
point of these examples is only to illustrate briefly how property
theorists might explore the standard theory, but not to provide
an exhaustive accounting of the many faces of property. Further
(and undoubtedly better) examples of each approach abound:
Carol Rose's limited commons property, Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamed's opposition of property and liability rules,
Margaret Jane Radin's personhood approach, and so on.22
20

YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

99 (2d ed. 1997).

21 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 35-36 (1990) (showing successful close-knit com-

mons regimes); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347, 354 (1967) (explaining privatization).
22 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Carol M. Rose, The
Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emissions Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129 (1998).
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A.

The Constructive Approach

The constructive approach works by offering a new ideal type,
essentially by creating a new vocabulary to describe a complex
real world problem. In this sense, constructing a useful new ideal
type in property theory can be understood as (more or less) like
identifying a new element or particle in physics-both help identify and explain previously puzzling real world phenomena.
While there are many ways to go outside the usual trilogy, this
section will set out just the anticommons ideal type.23 I developed "anticommons" property as a fourth ideal type because I
walked down a Moscow street and noticed an anomaly that the
standard trilogy could not explain. One consequence of adding
this ideal type to the analytic toolkit is to give voice to certain
previously inchoate worries about the progressive tide of privatization, to explain why too much private property can be as
costly as too little-a perspective that the standard trilogy makes
difficult to articulate. Figure 2 suggests how the idea of private
property can be relocated by adding the anticommons ideal type.
In effect, private property becomes the middle of a new spectrum, an equilibrium that may be approximated, rather than an
extreme that may be asymptotically achieved.
FIGURE

2:

THE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH

\

/
\/
\

/
\

/

Anticommons property can be most easily understood as the
mirror image of commons property. A resource is prone to
overuse in a tragedy of the commons when too many owners
23 The material defining anticommons property draws substantially from Michael
A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Propertyin the Transitionfrom Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); the biomedical example comes from
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698 (1998).
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each have a privilege to use a given resource, and no one has a
right to exclude another. By contrast, a resource is prone to underuse in a tragedy of the anticommons when multiple owners
each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and
no one has an effective privilege of use. In theory, in a world of
costless transactions, people could always avoid commons or anticommons tragedy by trading their rights to higher valued users.
In practice, however, market actors face often insuperable collective action problems. Avoiding tragedy requires overcoming
transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases of participants, with success less likely among strangers in markets than
within close-knit communities of repeat players. Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into usable private property
may prove to be brutal and slow.
Legal and economics scholars have generally overlooked evidence of anticommons tragedy when it appeared because the
problem did not fit within the familiar property trilogy. Nevertheless, waste through underuse can appear whenever governments create new property rights, as with privatization in postsocialist economies. One promise of transition to markets was
that new entrepreneurs would fill stores that socialist rule had
left bare. Yet after several years of reform, many privatized
storefronts remained empty, while flimsy metal kiosks, stocked
full of goods, mushroomed up on the streets. Why did the new
merchants not come in from the cold? One reason was that transition governments often failed to endow any individual with a
bundle of rights that represents full ownership. Instead, fragmented rights were distributed to various socialist-era stakeholders, including private or quasi-private enterprises, workers'
collectives, privatization agencies, and local, regional, and federal
governments. No one could set up shop without first collecting
rights from each of the other owners.
This definition of anticommons property is constructed in such
a way as to render it useful for describing emerging real-world
property regimes. For example, to have an anticommons, I do
not require that everyone hold rights of exclusion, but only that a
limited group of owners be able to block each other. Waste
through non-use can occur even when a few actors have rights of
exclusion in a resource that each wants to use. Also, my definition does not require that non-use be optimal. There are many
situations in which non-use results from excessive fragmentation,
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but is not socially desirable. For most resources that people care
about, some level of use is preferable to non-use, and an anticommons regime is a threat to, rather than the epitome of, productive use. Finally, an anticommons may be created even when
multiple rights of exclusion are not formally granted through the
legal system.
Once defined in this inclusive way, the term becomes available
to help explain other previously overlooked phenomena. For example, privatization of upstream biomedical research in the
United States may create anticommons property that is less visible than empty storefronts, but even more economically and socially costly.2 4 In this setting, privatization takes the form of
intellectual property claims to the sorts of research results that, in
an earlier era, would have been made freely available in the public domain. Today, upstream research in the biomedical sciences
is increasingly likely to be "private" in one or more senses of the
term-supported by private funds, carried out in a private institution, or privately appropriated through patents, trade secrecy,
or agreements that restrict the use of materials and data. Several
types of biomedical research anticommons property may arise.
One example emerges from gene fragments, which may now be
patented before researchers have identified any corresponding
gene, protein, biological function, or potential commercial product. Yet foreseeable commercial products, such as therapeutic
proteins or genetic diagnostic tests, likely require use of multiple
fragments. So the proliferation of patents on individual fragments held by different owners seems inevitably to require future
costly transactions to bundle licenses together before a firm can
have an effective right to develop useful products.
As Rebecca Eisenberg and I have shown, such an anticommons in biomedical research may be more likely to endure than
in other areas of intellectual property because of particular, high
transaction costs of bargaining, heterogeneous interests among
owners, and the predictable cognitive biases of scientific researchers.2 5 But there is little public outcry to fix a biomedical
anticommons because the price people pay-life-saving drugs
that are not discovered-is invisible. Like transition to free markets in post-socialist economies, privatization of biomedical research offers both promises and risks. It promises to spur private
24
25

Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 700-01.
Id.
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investment, but risks creating a tragedy of the anticommons
through a proliferation of fragmented and overlapping property
rights. Constructing the anticommons ideal type helps to show
why privatization must be more carefully deployed if it is to serve
the public goals of biomedical research and post-socialist transition. Otherwise, in the biomedical context more upstream rights
may lead paradoxically to fewer useful products for improving
human health, and in post-socialism, excessive privatization can
have the unintended effect of turning people against the benefits
of market reforms.
The anticommons property ideal type adds to our analytic
toolkit by going beyond the familiar trilogy; reveals how privatization can cause an unexpected, new form of resource tragedy;
and challenges law-and-economists' too-simple understanding of
private property.
B.

The Integrative Approach

The existing trilogy also can be challenged using what I call an
integrative approach, one that brings together elements of the
existing ideal types into something surprising and new. To
stretch the (admittedly weak) physics analogy under which the
constructive approach is like discovering a new element, the integrative approach is like combining already-existing elements
into a quite distinct compound-such as alloying copper and tin
into bronze. Consider the "liberal commons" idea that Hanoch
Dagan and I are developing (noting again ours is just one of
many possible integrative approaches). We puzzled over cases
where people have created property regimes that seem both to
achieve the gains from cooperation that communitarians seek
and to preserve the right to exit that liberals demand-a combination seen for example in the rapid rise of common interest residential communities. By integrating existing ideal types, we hope
to make the most distinctive, perplexing, and previously obscured aspects of emerging regimes more tractable for legal
theory.
According to the standard trilogy, integrative solutions should
not be possible because private and common property seem intrinsically in opposition, a tragic choice. The Blackstonian image
of private property as "sole despotic dominion" is traditionally
wrapped up with the idea of individual autonomy and the right of
exit. Within this ideal type, introducing complex notions of coop-
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eration seems almost impossible. By contrast, the core of the
commons property ideal type seems to involve wide access to
scarce resources, the possibility for cooperation, and little concern for autonomy or exit. The traditional trilogy is constructed
so that private and commons property seem in essence to repel
one another, and as an inadvertent consequence, real world examples that bridge the two types are rendered invisible in property theory. An integrative approach draws new life from
existing analytic categories. By pulling from familiar existing
types, private and commons, we suggest that the core elements of
exit and cooperation can be brought together to create something distinct and surprising. Using the same simple schematic as
the previous figures, Figure 3 suggests the distinctive characteristic of the integrative approach.
FIGURE

3:

THE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH

\

/

\

/
\

/

My current work with Hanoch Dagan illustrates this integrative approach to the property trilogy.2 6 We look at the complex
forms of internal self-governance that make cooperation work in
new real-world property regimes, and then abstract from those
practical solutions to re-conceptualize the private and commons
ideal types of ownership. Integrating those two forms suggests a
new analytic tool, what we call "the liberal commons." In our
definition, a liberal commons is a legal regime that enables a limited group of owners to capture the economic and social benefits
from cooperative use of a scarce resource, while also ensuring
autonomy to individual members who each retain a secure right
to exit.
The liberal commons challenges entrenched property theory
26 This section draws substantially from Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The
Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. (forthcoming Jan. 2001).
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built on oppositions inherent in the existing trilogy. According
to these familiar views, the liberal commons is an oxymoron in
theory, impossible in practice, and therefore unworthy of support
by law. "Communitarians," who celebrate successful commons
property regimes, openly promote their illiberal character. They
emphasize that restrictions on exit are essential in a flourishing
community, for only by locking people together can small, closeknit groups develop the informal norms key to conserving commons resources. "Privatizers" counter that breaking up commons property augurs better for efficiency and autonomy. Most
economists join this camp because they worry that rational owners will over-consume commons resources, while most liberals
join in because they object to locking people together. "Regulators" call for state command and control where communitarian
or privatization approaches can not apply. For all, the opposition
of commons and private property proves an ideal foil, a shared
counterpoint for otherwise competing advocates of community,
efficiency, autonomy, and state authority.
Our approach rejects the oppositions between private and
commons property. More precisely, by integrating these types in
theory, and showing how these types can work together in practice, we dissolve the "tragedy of the commons" conundrum. The
tragedy metaphor has long been understood to refer to the problem of tragic outcomes. In recent years, communitarians answered the outcome debate by showing that a commons can
succeed, but only in an illiberal environment. Liberals justifiably
countered that illiberal successes are still tragic and pushed for
privatization. Seen through our prism, the debate between the
communitarians and the liberals relies too heavily on false oppositions between commons and private property. Rightly considered, their debate should be reframed in terms of the question of
tragic choice: are we doomed to choose between our liberal commitments and the economic and social benefits available in a
commons? The integrative approach suggests that we are not
necessarily so doomed. Constructing a liberal commons is indeed a challenge, but it is not inherently contradictory or practically unattainable-though the familiar trilogy obscures the
meaning of already-existing integrative solutions.
In our view, marital property, trusts, condominiums, partnerships, and corporations all belong under a single analytic umbrella: they are forms of liberal commons property. Each is a
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legal invention that encourages people voluntarily to come together and create limited-access and limited-purpose communities dedicated to shared management of a scarce resource. Each
offers internal self-governance mechanisms to facilitate cooperation and the peaceable joint creation of wealth, while simultaneously limiting minority oppression and allowing exit. For more
and more resources, the old-fashioned image of sole private
property has become impracticable and misleading; perhaps deterring people from creating even more successful variations on
our theme.
By introducing the liberal commons as an analytic tool, we
make the already-existing liberal commons regimes more visible
and more tractable for jurisprudential and practical property theory work. For example, the idea of a liberal commons helps draw
attention to a puzzle: why is there such a sharp contrast between
existing liberal commons regimes and the unified hostility of legal theory and Anglo-American co-ownership law to cooperation? Our analytic tool can be deployed wherever people want
to work together, but are prevented from doing so by background property rules premised on the old-fashioned Blackstonian image of private property and the unreflective hostility to
cooperation built into the tragedy of the commons image. By
showing how a liberal commons can integrate the benefits of private and commons forms, this dynamic approach to property analytics advances normative debates.
C.

The Definitional Approach

Finally, the definitional approach, which may seem the most
obvious, is instead the most in need of analytic reworking. Our
understanding of private property itself is built on a thin reed,
derived mostly today from an amalgam of undigested philosophical musings summarized by the "bundle of rights" metaphor.
The bundle metaphor is pervasive in property-speak and structures large segments of theoretical and practical debate, yet it
poorly describes emerging property innovations and problems.
Unlike the previous sections, I am much more tentative here, and
will just introduce the problem and suggest an approach.
Where does the bundle of rights come from? According to the
stylized history taught to generations of law students and applied
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by judges everyday,2 7 people understood property as a physical
thing or a legal thing until this century. Lawyers then recast it as
an abstract bundle of legal relations, a process that culminates in
what is now called the standard Hohfeld-Honor6 analysis-a
widespread but still remarkably thin account of ownership.
Neither the old nor new metaphors convey well the nuanced way
law structures control over scarce resources.
Under the old metaphor, property involves the physical ownership of discrete, individually-owned things, an image symbolized by the medieval ceremony of "livery of seisin" which
gathered people in a field to exchange ownership by handing
over a clod of dirt. This thing-ownership metaphor is conventionally summarized in Blackstone's talismanic quotation cited
earlier. Similarly, the idea of private property as a "legal thing,"
which arises in part because ownership has no intrinsic form, has
a lineage as ancient as the image of property as a "physical
thing." Fees, life estates, easements, and leases all represent
complex legal things distinct from physical things. Although superseded in property theory, the thing-ownership metaphor continues today as a theme in popular understanding. It is easy to
think of houses, fields, or farms as things because resources defined on this scale can be put to productive use. The problem
with the thing-ownership metaphor, and part of the reason for its
demise, is that it does not help identify boundaries of complex
governance arrangements and modern intangible property.
The metaphoric shift from thing-ownership to bundle of relations can be traced to the late 1800s.28 Though its modern version is usually attributed to Hohfeld, he never mentions a
"bundle of rights." Nevertheless, he developed the now standard
idea that property comprises a complex aggregate of social and
legal relationships made up of rights, privileges, duties, and immunities. This vision contrasts with "the simple and nonsocial
relationship between a person and a thing that Blackstone's
27 The material in this section is drawn from Heller, supra note 7, at 1187-94.
28 The earliest use of the term "bundle of rights" appears to be from John Lewis,
in his 1888 treatise, The Law of Eminent Domain: "The dullest individual among the
people knows and understands that his property in anything is a bundle of rights."
JOHN LEWIS,

A

TREATISE

ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN

IN THE UNITED

STATES 43 (1888) (quoted in J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Prop-

erty, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 713 n.8 (1996) (citing Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New
Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of
Property, 29 BuFF. L. REv. 325 (1980) (tracing the metaphor))).
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description suggested."2 9 The Hohfeldian view moved quickly
from legal theory into the 1936 Restatement of Property and
from there into mainstream scholarship and judicial decisionmaking. For example, the American Law of Property now defines private property to be "an aggregate of legal relations
' 30
which has economic or sale value if transfer be allowed.
Despite the pervasiveness of this modern image, I have elsewhere shown how the bundle metaphor can have pernicious consequences in property law.3 1 While the metaphor captures the
possibility of complex fragmentation, it gives a weak sense of the
"thingness" still inherent in private property. So long as property theorists continue to rely on the modern bundle of legal relations metaphor, they need some analytical tool to distinguish
things from fragments, bundles from rights, and private from
non-private property, in cases where those distinctions matter.
Lacking such a perspective has practical consequences. For example, the Supreme Court has uncritically adopted the bundle of
rights view of property and used it inadvertently, I argue, to collapse the idea of private property as a distinct economic and constitutional category.
As the bundle of rights waxes in judicial decision-making, it is
waning in property theory. J. E. Penner has written caustically
that, "I believe in giving dead concepts [such as the bundle of
rights metaphor] a decent burial";3 2 Carol Rose has suggested
the thought experiment of moving from land to water as a core
organizing image for property; 33 and in conversation, property
scholars Brian Simpson, Gregory Alexander, Tom Merrill and
many others concur that the time has come for a better core metaphor. A definitional approach could perhaps re-characterize existing metaphors as Newtonian holdovers and propose moving to
something more up-to-date, such as a quantum or string-theory
metaphor. Alternatively, we might look to redescribing the familiar opposition of property as thing and bundle, as particle and
29 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY

&

PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF

PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 321 (1997).

30 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.1 n.1 (A. James Casner ed., 1952 & Supp.
1958); see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 2-6 (1936) (adopting Hohfeldian

definition of property).
31 Heller, supra note 7, at 1202-20
jurisprudence).
32 Penner, supra note 28, at 819.

(criticizing Supreme

Court

takings

33 Carol M. Rose, Propertyas the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 329,

351 (1996) (comparing land and water as metaphors for property).
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wave. This is whimsical: to be persuasive, efforts to redefine the
term must resonate with existing property debates while they
must better describe new possibilities. The point here is not to
solve the problem, but to suggest that an important analytic puzzle exists, with a prize to the property theorist able to solve it.
Figure 4 suggests the challenge of the definitional approach.
FIGURE

4:

THE DEFINITIONAL APPROACH
G

The standard trilogy, the tragedy of the commons, the bundle
of rights ... each of these analytic tools has served long and well
the needs of property theorists and policymakers, but each has
reached limits that press us to new work. Whether following a
constructive, integrative, or definitional approach, paying close
attention to emerging, on-the-ground property relations can lead
to new interpretations of private property that in turn open provocative normative debates.
D. Deploying the Three Methods
Understanding what is private property is an inductive and iterative process, one that looks to the chaos of real world relations and identifies some puzzle that is not well-captured by the
existing framework, something new, something striking-a conundrum hidden or misdescribed by existing theory. While each
puzzle requires its own analytic solutions, the constructive, integrative, and definitional approaches share the key feature of
starting from a concrete observation, abstracting from that observation so that it crystalizes in a new analytic tool with normative
and practical implications, and then using that tool to make innovative solutions more easily imaginable and achievable.
When should a constructive approach be used? When an integrative or definitional one? The variants differ according to

Three Faces of Private Property

the limitations imposed by the existing analytic tools on which
they build. For example, the problem of excessive fragmentation
of property appears in what had been terra incognita, on the
other side of the ownership spectrum from commons to private
property. So constructing an anticommons type has the effect of
putting fragmentation on the map, relocating private property to
the middle of a new continuum, and exposing the possibility of
"too much" property.
By contrast, the integrative method works better when the
problem is to draw out new implications from existing ideal
types. For example, Dagan and I noticed that the images of private and commons property had always been interpreted in opposition, but that real-world property relations were melding the
two forms together to create something distinct. By identifying
the liberal commons, existing private and commons property
types can be re-deployed to support the gains possible from
emerging forms of cooperation in managing scarce resources.
Similarly, with the definitional approach, the existing images of
private property have begun to have visible and costly consequences, as with the Court's misguided takings jurisprudence.
Each method to revitalize private property is always available;
which variant seems more promising depends on the contingency
of the puzzle that needs explaining. For all variants, the goal and
measure is simplicity and persuasion.
CONCLUSION

Ideal typical understandings of property infuse the normative
and practical debates that matter. What happens if the core of
property evolves, mutates, refuses to hold still? For example,
what if the existing trilogy of property forms-private, commons,
and state-hides tragedy and impedes imagination and innovation at the frontiers of property? Then new definitions of private
property, in constructive, integrative, and definitional variants,
can update the hoary metaphors of property law while carrying a
powerful normative punch. Beyond the standard trilogy lie new
and useful concepts, not just anticommons property and the liberal commons, but also as-yet unnamed property theory tools
that will respond to as-yet unexplored property puzzles.
None of the basic terms for property are stable-this is not to
say property has disintegrated, but rather that property scholarship can gain from pushing its categories to reflect better the
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changing on-the-ground relations. We can move beyond polarizing oppositions that render practical problems invisible and jurisprudential debates unresolvable.

